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There may be a way to maintain a monistic wavefunction ontology, but it is 
certainly not trivial to see what that way is 
(Maudlin 2010, 129, his emphasis) 
  
 
Murray Gell-Mann and James Hartle have made an original proposal for a version 
of decoherent histories quantum mechanics which is specifically tailored so as not 
to imply the emergence of multiple quasi-classical worlds. I argue that there is an 
explanatory gap in the proposal but that there remains an important insight which 
might be used to tackle what can be seen as an outstanding problem for Hugh 
Everett III’s “relative state” interpretation of quantum mechanics, if it is 
understood as giving ontic priority to the wavefunction. The argument employs a 
recent novel analysis of self-location within any sort of multiverse. 
 
 
1. All Coherence Gone. 
 
“A quantum universe can be described by many decohering sets of alternative 
coarse-grained histories - many realms”. So wrote Jim Hartle (2010, 94). 
Characterized in that way, decoherent histories quantum mechanics (DHqm) is 
suggestive of Hugh Everett III’s “relative state” interpretation (RSqm) in the 
version currently championed by theorists such as Simon Saunders and David 
Wallace1. But Hartle and Murray Gell-Mann, both involved in the development of 
DHqm, have long been reluctant to concede that many realms, many emergent 
worlds, exist. And that’s understandable; the idea that we have vast multitudes of 
doppelgangers living divergent lives on other planets which are constantly 
                                                
1 For discussion and references see (Saunders 2010a, 8-12; Wallace 2010a). 
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emerging from an underlying “fine-grained” physical reality can seem a 
somewhat extravagant hypothesis which is to be avoided if possible.2 
Of course, it may well be that our universe is spatially infinite and so 
contains a countable infinity of finite, causally isolated Hubble spheres whose past 
lightcones are isomorphic to the one which constitutes the visible hypersurface of 
our local region. That would also yield hosts of doppelgangers living parallel and 
divergent lives. But on our current understanding it is a contingent matter whether 
a spatially infinite universe contains infinitely many galaxies. In that case, maybe 
we have multitudinous doppelgangers and maybe not. But many see RSqm as 
entailing that similar legions exist necessarily. Furthermore, if all Hartle’s realms 
were real, that can seem to imply that we and our environment are constantly 
branching into myriad worlds which would conventionally be described as 
possible rather than actual. In trying to free DHqm of this specter Gell-Mann 
wrote: 
 
To use the language we [he and Hartle] recommend is to address the 
familiar notion that a given system can have different possible 
histories, each with its own probability, it is not necessary to become 
queasy trying to conceive of many ‘parallel universes’, all equally 
real. (1994, 138)  
 
Decoupling DHqm from RSqm has not proved so easy, but in a new paper Gell-
Mann and Hartle (2011) claim to have achieved their goal of having DHqm 
without the many worlds which they take to be entailed by RSqm. Their argument 
turns on a concept of “extended probabilities”. These have values outside the 
range 0-1 but are precisely related to conventional probabilities with values within 
that range (ibid., 4, eqn. 2.2). The extended probabilities apply to fine-grained 
histories and it is the decoherent coarse-graining of sets of fine-grained histories 
which yield the conventional probabilities attaching to coarse-grained histories. 
The upshot is a novel account of, for instance, a two-slit experiment. For an 
                                                
2 Jeffrey Barrett (2011) argues that RSqm is not committed to the existence of many worlds, in 
which case Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s concern can be seen as misplaced.  
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electron arriving at the detector screen as part of the interference pattern it is true 
that it passed though only one of the slits. But it is not possible to assign 
probabilities to the electron having passed through the left slit or the right slit. 
Only extended probabilities can be assigned to these fine-grained alternatives, 
implying that it would be impossible to settle a bet on which of the alternatives 
actually occurred (ibid., 3). 
 Downstream from the slits, just before the electron reaches the screen, the 
characteristic waveform of the electron is to be understood as the coarse-graining 
of an ensemble of fine-grained histories. The squared modulus of amplitude yields 
conventional probabilities but the waveform is to be understood as describing a 
notional ensemble of fine-grained histories only one of which exists. Again, the 
single extant electron is somewhere in front of the screen but only an extended 
probability can be assigned to any possible region where that electron may be. 
The idea that the ensemble of fine-grained histories is notional and only one of 
them actually exists is central to Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s attempt to avoid the 
many-worlds of RSqm. As they put it:  
 
This real history is described by embedding it in an ensemble of 
comparable imagined fine-grained histories, not unlike the familiar 
ensemble of statistical mechanics. (ibid., 1) 
 
Describing the fine-grained histories requires a choice of preferred variables and 
Gell-Mann and Hartle write: 
 
The fine-grained histories are described by a preferred set of 
variables which we take to be those of a sum-over-histories 
formulation of quantum mechanics. They are histories of particle 
positions in the case of particles, four-dimensional field 
configurations — both bosonic and fermionic — in the case of 
quantum field theory, and histories of geometries and fields in the 
case of semiclassical quantum gravity. Histories of these variables 
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are assumed to be the most refined description of the system 
possible. 
A strong case can be made that these histories are adequate for 
the prediction of all observable quantities. (ibid., 3) 
 
But, accepting that assumption, there still seems to be a problem with Gell-
Mann’s and Hartle’s proposal. Their one true fine-grained history is rather like a 
lone ant in an anthill. The erratic path which the ant follows may well be identical 
to that of an ant interacting with a host of fellows, the ant may move as if it were 
one of a community even if it’s all alone, but if no such community exists any 
causal explanation of why the ant moves thus and so looks obscure. There’s a 
fundamental difference between the proposed notional ensemble and the “familiar 
ensemble of statistical mechanics”. It is that for the classical system there is a 
simple dynamics internal to one instance of the ensemble. But Gell-Mann’s and 
Hartle’s unique fine-grained history has no such simple internal dynamics. As 
they put it: 
 
The set of all fine-grained histories between an arbitrary pair of 
times t0 and tf is the set of all such paths {qi(t)} between these two 
times. They are continuous but typically non-differentiable. (ibid., 3)  
 
The unique fine-grained history is only calculable because it behaves as if it were 
interacting with other members of the ensemble. Histories which have not 
decohered interfere non-negligibly. But if Gell-Mann and Hartle were right 
quantum interference would not exist as a physical process. It would be purely 
notional. Now, it may be logically possible that there is one fine-grained history 
with an internal dynamics which is extremely complex and only describable as if 
it were one of an ensemble of histories mutually interacting in a way described by 
the evolution of the wavefunction. But, on the face of it, isn’t it more plausible 
that the ensemble exists? 
I shall not attempt to press that point further. What I’m concerned to show 
here is that if the ensemble of fine-grained histories is regarded as extant rather 
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than notional then Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s work may help to resolve what some 
have seen an outstanding problem for RSqm. It has long been overlooked by 
many working with Everett’s relative state interpretation that it provides no 
coherent realist account of what’s going on in the paradigm two-slit experiment. 
According to RSqm what passes through the slits is the wavefunction  of the 
electron. But what, precisely, is that? Tim Maudlin (2010) stresses that this 
fundamental ontological question remains unanswered. In what follows I’m going 
to argue that Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s characterization of fine-grained histories in 
terms of extended probabilities, coupled with a novel interpretation of the location 
of an observer within a multiverse, can yield an answer to the question which 
Maudlin poses. This need not in any way threaten Hartle’s claim that “Extended 
probabilities give a simple and general way of formulating quantum theory” 
(2008, 1).3  
 
2. Self-Location in a Multiverse. 
 
Maudlin’s problem has to do with the constitution of philosophers’ tables and 
chairs. It can seem that according to RSqm they are nothing but seething masses 
of wavefunction. But if Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s one fine-grained history really 
were all that exists then a table could, for instance, be understood as being 
constituted by a fragment of a history involving particles with definite, albeit non-
differentiable, trajectories. The wavefunction would be banished, so to speak, to 
the domain of the notional ensemble. 
However, if  Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s ensemble were taken as extant rather 
than notional then the wavefunction would become instantiated by that 
multiplicity of fine-grained histories. In that case our local environment would 
seem to be constituted by a sort of minimal slice of wavefunction. The idea would 
be this. If the ensemble exists then the one coarse-grained history which we 
inhabit would consist of a multitude of mutually interacting fine-grained histories. 
But presumably our own bodies and brains would be constituted by elements of 
                                                
3 For an alternative approach to providing a fundamental ontology for RSqm see (Wallace and 
Timpson 2010). 
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only one of those fine-grained histories. Each of us would have a multitude of 
doppelgangers in environments which were isomorphic at the coarse-grained level 
but anisomorphic at the fine-grained level. For a bunch of such doppelgangers 
about to observe an electron detected at the screen of a two-slit apparatus there 
would be some doppelgangers relative to whom the electron had gone through the 
left slit and some relative to whom it had gone  through the right slit. 
On this picture our philosophers’ table is constituted by a minimal slice of 
wavefunction because we as observers are only ever instantiated by one fine-
grained history, even if the other fine-grained histories of the ensemble exist. The 
table which a given observer sees would be a table sharing a particular fine-
grained history with that observer. But a change of perspective is possible which 
brings the wavefunction closer to home. The inspiration comes from reflection on 
a genre of thought experiments which have been prominent in analytic philosophy 
of mind in recent decades and are often called Twin Earth thought experiments4. 
We are asked to imagine two matched doppelgangers, each on one of two 
isomorphic Earthlike planets. Because these thought experiments are directed 
towards understanding the relation between a creature’s mentality and its 
environment, an anisomorphism is usually introduced but for the moment let’s 
think about a pair of planets which are perfectly isomorphic. 
Until recently it has been universally assumed that in a Twin Earth setup 
there are two numerically distinct subjects, one on each planet, and the discussion 
focuses on whether or not their mentality differs. However, it turns out that it is 
possible to interpret the setup as involving a single subject with a single mental 
life which is doubly instantiated, just as any matched pair of objects on the planets 
instantiate one and the same physical form. The full details of this novel 
interpretation of doppelgangers are to be found in (Tappenden 2011b) and it 
would be inappropriate to set out the arguments at length here, but I shall outline 
the salient points. 
Call the single subject instantiated by a pair of doppelgangers Una and 
imagine that Una is thinking of a table that it is round. On a standard 
representational view of mind it is supposed that Una entertains the thought 
                                                
4 See (Putnam 1975) for the seminal paper. 
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because she deploys a mental representation. It is perhaps most plausible that that 
representation is manifest as a cerebral process5. On that assumption, in Una’s 
case what constitutes the single mental representation she deploys is the pair of 
relevant isomorphic cerebral processes going on in the heads of the two 
doppelgangers. 
Ordinarily, for a mental representation to represent a table’s being round it 
is supposed to be the vehicle of a representational content which is expressed by 
the proposition “T is round” where T is the table in question. How the 
representation comes to bear its content is controversial but need not concern us. 
However, in Una’s case it appears that what she’s thinking about is not a table but 
a pair of isomorphic tables. So in order to coherently interpret Una as a single 
subject it is necessary to understand her as thinking not about a table but about 
what might be called a 2-table, where a 2-table is not just any pair of isomorphic 
tables but rather a corresponding pair of isomorphs in matched worlds of the Twin 
Earth genre. Clearly that genre of multiverse may contain any number of 
isomorphic worlds of the sort Una’s doppelgangers inhabit so there’s scope for 3-
tables, 4-tables and so on, assuming that worlds are understood as finite and 
causally isolated, like Hubble spheres. 
So we might attribute the content expressed by “2T is round” to Una’s 
mental representation, where 2T is the 2-table in question. But this raises a 
problem. It makes no sense to say of a pair of tables that it is round. What is 
needed is to modify the predicate. The appropriate modification is to introduce the 
idea that an n-table is n-round if and only if each of its component tables is round.  
So we attribute the content “2T is 2round” to Una’s mental representation. Where 
the conventional “plural” interpretation of doppelgangers would suppose that 
there were matched doppelgangers in a pair of isomorphic worlds each thinking of 
a local table that it is round, on the novel “unitary” interpretation we have Una 
thinking of a single 2-table that it is 2-round. 
The unitary interpretation of doppelgangers can be applied to understanding 
the thoughts, speech and intentional actions of a single subject spanning any 
                                                
5 “Extended mind” theorists currently claim that some mental representations may be constituted 
by elements of an organism’s environment but that is controversial and anyway does not affect the 
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number of isomorphic worlds. But this is from a third-person point of view. We 
imagine the interpreter as somehow standing outside that multiverse and looking 
down on it; the god’s eye perspective. But how might we think of ourselves as 
inhabiting a multiverse, each of us spanning a multitude of isomorphic worlds? 
What we see as a table is a table, not an n-table. And a round table in our observed 
environment cannot be round because it is an aggregate of round objects. If we 
observed a table to weigh a dozen kilograms that table could not be an aggregate 
of a multitude of objects each weighing a dozen kilograms. The weight of an 
aggregate is the sum of the weights of its parts. 
The way forward is to suppose that an object in our environment may be a 
set of isomorphic elements. Willard Van Orman Quine once proposed that any 
particular, such as a table, could be understood as being a self-membered 
singleton set (1969, 31-2). The idea now is that a table in our environment may be 
a multipleton set, reducing to being a self-membered singleton if there is no 
multiverse. But if we span a number n of isomorphic worlds we can imagine that 
any number of them might suddenly disappear, leaving us spanning any sample of 
the original collection but still faced with a table. So any subset of the original 
table must also be a table. Any table we’re left with could then be understood to 
have some observable property if and only if each of its subsets had that property. 
It’s necessary to introduce the qualification “observable” because clearly the 
number of elements constituting a table which is a multipleton set cannot be the 
same as for each of its subset tables. However, it is plausible that if we were to 
span a multitude of isomorphic worlds the magnitude of that multitude would not 
be observable; if the number of worlds should change we would not notice any 
difference. This leads to the following proposal for the constitution of objects in 
our environment if we are to coherently understand ourselves as being single 
subjects spanning a multitude of worlds. Corresponding matched objects in 




                                                                                                                                 




Any environmental object O is a set of self-membered singletons 
which are parallel world counterparts and O possesses some 
observable property F if and only if all the subsets of O possess F. 
(Tappenden 2011b, 133)6 
 
According to Concrete Sets, if we inhabit a multiverse consisting of a number n of  
isomorphic worlds then any table we observe in our local environment has n! 
subsets which are all isomorphic tables and our table is round because all its 
subset tables are round. Note that the idea has so far been applied to thought 
experiments of the Twin Earth genre where quantum mechanics is not an issue. I 
shall come to applying the idea to an ensemble of fine-grained histories in the 
final section. But first it will be useful to pursue these thoughts further in a 
classical context. 
 
3. A Classical Model for Linear Superposition. 
 
Return to the god’s eye view of our two isomorphic planets and imagine that Una 
reports seeing a black box before her. What we see from our detached perspective 
is two matched black boxes and we can understand Una as speaking truly if we 
take her to be referring to a 2-black 2-box. But suppose that, unbeknown to Una, 
the interiors of the matched black boxes are causally isolated from their 
surrounding environments allowing a contained anisomorphism between the two 
planets. One box contains a black cat and the other contains a white cat. Una’s 2-
box thus harbors a 2-cat since each component box contains a cat, but the 2-cat is 
neither 2-black nor 2-white since the component cats are neither both black nor 
both white. However, we could say that Una’s 2-cat is ½-black and ½-white in the 
sense that half the component cats of the 2-cat are black and half are white. 
Imagine now what would plausibly happen if Una were to unmask the 
contents of her 2-box. On one planet a doppelganger’s retinas would register an 
                                                
6 This proposal is incompatible with David Lewis’s Main Thesis in his Parts of Classes (1991, 7) 
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image of a black cat and on the other planet the corresponding doppelganger’s 
retinas would register an image of a white cat. We could expect Una to undergo 
personal fission into an observer seeing a black cat and an observer seeing a white 
cat. The analogy with the RSqm fission account of what would happen to an 
observer unveiling Schrödinger’s proverbial boxed cat is unmistakable. There has 
been much discussion of how an informed subject about to make an observation 
using, say, a Stern-Gerlach apparatus to measure spin should understand their 
predicament if believing RSqm7. Here I shall simply assume that such a subject 
can intelligibly suppose that their situation is in some sense like that of a subject 
who believes that a stochastic process takes place and expects to see either one or 
the other possible outcome with a given probability. Since it is controversial 
whether such analyses can be understood in terms of genuine probabilities I shall 
speak of *probability (star probability) for branching contexts. To be clear about 
this, the idea is that if a subject knows that they will undergo personal fission into 
subjects observing different outcomes A, B, C… then prior to fission the subject 
can intelligibly assign *probabilities to observing A, observing B, observing C 
and so on. There is then a question of what values the *probabilities should take. 
For RSqm much work has gone into attempting to show that those values should 
be equal to the relevant squared moduli of amplitude.8 
So, if Una were to be informed about her situation prior to opening the 2-
box, the analogy with RSqm would suggest that she should regard her situation as 
somehow being like that of being able to assign probabilities to the seeing of a 
black or a white cat. Since Una is to fission into two subjects a first thought might 
be that she should assign a *probability of ½ to each outcome. But on further 
reflection this becomes problematic. For suppose Una spanned three isomorphic 
planets and were faced with a 3-box where two component boxes contained 
matched black cats and the third contained a white cat. We should still expect that 
Una would fission into one observer seeing a black cat and one seeing a white cat. 
Which might again suggest that if informed she should suppose the situation as 
being somehow like having a fifty-fifty chance of seeing black or white. And yet 
                                                
7 For a variety of views see (Saunders and Wallace 2008; Greaves and Myrvold 2010; Saunders 
2010b; Papineau 2010; Tappenden 2011a). 
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it’s tempting to think that the proportions of parallel worlds containing black cats 
and white cats might somehow be analogous to the squared moduli of amplitude 
in the quantum-mechanical case. 
This suspicion can in fact find some backing. So as not to be restricted to a 
finite model and the concept of proportion, suppose Una spans an infinite number 
of parallel  worlds and now, into the classical model, let’s introduce the idea of an 
irreducibly stochastic process which selects whether a boxed cat on a given planet 
is black or white. We can imagine that Una’s multi-box is equipped with a multi-
button and when she presses the multi-button a stochastic process takes place on 
each planet. And suppose that on each planet the stochastic process is such that 
there’s a two-thirds chance of the cat being black and a one-third chance of its 
being white. The limit frequency measures across the set of worlds will be two-
thirds for black cats and one-third for white cats. 
Now let’s for a moment abandon the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers 
and revert to the standard plural interpretation. In that case, we have one subject in 
each world where a stochastic process takes place and if each of those 
doppelgangers, prior to opening the box, were to state their chance of seeing a 
black cat they would be speaking truly if they were to say that the probability of 
seeing a black cat was two-thirds. But for the unitary interpretation of 
doppelgangers to be consistent Una must be taken to be speaking truly if she says 
that her situation is somehow like that of there being a probability of two-thirds 
that she will see a black cat. In other words, she should assign a *probability of 
two-thirds to that outcome. 
If talk of *probabilities  in branching scenarios is acceptable then it should 
be possible on the unitary interpretation to take Una as speaking of *probabilities 
rather than probabilities. But this alternative interpretation would collapse if the 
*probabilities of the unitary interpretation were not numerically equal to the 
probabilities of the standard plural interpretation. One might say, “so much the 
worse for the unitary interpretation” but that wouldn’t be justified because in the 
situation where Una fissions into two subjects making different observations there 
is no prior reason to suppose that she should assign a *probability of ½  to seeing 
                                                                                                                                 
8 For recent work on this issue see (Wallace 2010b). 
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one or the other outcome. And so there is no overriding justification for throwing 
out the unitary interpretation of doppelgangers on those grounds. 
The classical setup does not require that Una has a multi-button which 
initiates a stochastic process. I just used that idea for ease of exposition. 
Stochasticity could simply be introduced in determining the “initial conditions” 
for classical worlds, as in any classical deterministic theory. In that case the 
picture which emerges for the classical model is that if we have a large collection 
of worlds which are parallel up to a point but with differing initial conditions then 
an observer spanning a fiber-bundle of such worlds will be subject to personal 
fission when observing differing phenomena as that fiber-bundle differentiates 
into sub-bundles. And the limit frequency measures of worlds in branching sub-
bundles will be numerically equal to the informed subject’s *probability 
assignments.  
We can now apply this idea to an extant ensemble of fine-grained histories 
where a fine-grained history is understood in terms of extended probabilities, 
always remembering that the picture relies on the acceptability of the choice of 
preferred variables. 
 
4. A Constitution for Wavefunction. 
 
Return to the two-slit experiment and consider a part of an electron’s wavefront 
just prior to impinging on the detector screen. It contains the characteristic 
interference pattern. And suppose that Gell-Mann’s and Hartle’s notional 
ensemble of fine-grained histories actually exists. Now apply the unitary 
interpretation of doppelgangers and Concrete Sets. In that case the single electron 
in the observer’s environment is composed of a multitude of subset electrons. 
Each fine-grained history contains a relevant self-membered singleton subset 
electron. 
Relative to the observer, one subset electron has passed through the left slit 
and one has passed through the right slit (for the sake of simplicity I ignore 
marginal pathways such as those tunneling through the barrier in which the slits 
are made). Each of those subset electrons has a host of singleton electrons as 
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elements. For the chosen region of wavefront about to impinge on the screen there 
is a distribution of those fine-grained  singleton subset electrons, each with an 
associated extended probability in relation to being at a particular finite area of 
location. As decoherence takes place with the interaction between the observer’s 
single environmental electron and the screen, the ensemble of fine-grained 
histories branches into many coarse-grained histories, each composed of a sub-
ensemble of fine-grained histories. For each of those coarse-grained histories the 
squared modulus of amplitude yields a *probability associated with the electron 
being detected in a particular finite area of the screen and for RSqm those 
*probabilities are to be interpreted as being the so-called branch weights. 
The observer fissions into multiple observers, each seeing an electron 
activate a different detector in the array which makes up the screen. The single 
electron in each of the downstream observers’ environments is a subset of the 
single electron in the upstream observer’s environment. And the single electron in 
each of the downstream observers’ environments has a host of singleton electrons 
as elements. Each downstream observer spans a multitude of fine-grained 
histories which is a subset of the original ensemble and branch weight is a 
measure of the subset of histories constituting a branch relative to the pre-
branching set of histories.  
What we have here is an account of branching for RSqm which puts flesh 
on wavefunction. In general, any object in an observer’s environment, such as a 
table, can be understood to be constituted by wavefunction in the sense that the 
wavefunction of the table is the manifestation of an ensemble of  temporal 
segments of fine-grained histories which the observer inhabits as a single subject. 
The observer’s body and brain spans the same ensemble of fine-grained histories 
as are spanned by the observed table at the time it is observed,  that table being 
understood as a set with many tables as subsets. This account makes 
metaphysically precise a picture of the structure of the quantum multiverse 







Barrett, Jeffrey A. 2011. “On the Faithful Interpretation of Pure Wave 
Mechanics.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62: 693-709. 
Deutsch, David. 1985. “Quantum Theory as a Universal Physical Theory.” 
International Journal of Theoretical Physics 24:1–41. 
——— 1997. The Fabric of Reality. Harmondsworth: Allan Lane. 
——— 2002. “The Structure of the Multiverse.” Proceedings of the Royal Society 
of London A 455: 3129-37. 
Everett, Hugh III. 1957. “ ‘Relative state’ formulation of quantum mechanics.” 
Reviews of Modern Physics 29: 454–62. 
Hartle, James B. 2010. “Quasiclassical Realms.” In Saunders, Simon et al.. 
——— 2008. “Linear Positivity and Virtual Probability.” arXiv:quant-
ph/0401108v3.  
Gell-Mann, Murray. 1994. The Quark and the Jaguar. London: Abacus. 
Gell-Mann, Murray and James Hartle. 2011. “Decoherent Histories Quantum 
Mechanics with One ‘Real’ Fine-Grained History.” arXiv:quant-
ph/1106.0767v1. 
Greaves, Hilary and Wayne Myrvold. 2010. “Everett and Evidence.” In Saunders, 
Simon et al. 264-304. 
Lewis, David. 1991.  Parts of Classes. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Maudlin, Tim.  2010. “Can the World be Only Wavefunction?” In Saunders, 
Simon et al. 121-43. 
Menary, Richard (ed.). 2010. The Extended Mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Papineau, David. 2010. “A Fair Deal for Everettians.” in Saunders, Simon et al. 
206-26.  
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The meaning of ‘meaning’.” In Gunderson, Keith (ed.) 
Language, Mind and Knowledge. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1969. Set Theory and It's Logic. Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard. 
 15 
Saunders, Simon. 2010a. “Many Worlds? An Introduction.” In Saunders, Simon 
et al. 1-49.  
——— 2010b. “Chance in the Everett interpretation.” In Saunders, Simon et al. 
181-205. 
Saunders, Simon, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent and David Wallace (eds.). 2010. 
Many Worlds? Everett, Quantum Theory, & Reality. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Saunders, Simon and David Wallace. 2008. “Branching and Uncertainty.” British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 293-305. 
Tappenden, Paul. 2011a. “Evidence and Uncertainty in Everett’s Multiverse.” 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62: 99-123. 
——— 2011b. “A Metaphysics for Semantic Internalism.” Metaphysica 12: 125-
36. 
Wallace, David. 2010a. “Decoherence and Ontology.” In Saunders, Simon et al. 
53-72. 
——— 2010b. “How to Prove the Born Rule.” In Saunders, Simon et al. 227-63. 
Wallace, David  and Christopher G. Timpson. 2010. “Quantum Mechanics on 
Spacetime I: Spacetime State Realism.” British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science 61: 697-727. 
 
